






25 copies of speech to Public Affairs

Kevin Delaney - 8732 talked to Col. Susskind 11-73532 May 1
(figs for weapons through April) ARVN 39,087
AKG - 24,717

VC, ARVN
25,000 39,000

May 31 25,871 41,871 15,500
25,871
15,300

140,000 $\overline{.10}$
15,300
140
100



Remarks of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) John T. McNaughton
at the Graduation Ceremonies, University of Minnesota, Duluth
Branch, June 10, 1965

- - - - -

I am very happy to be here to share this occasion with you today. I would like to talk to you today on a subject that occupies a good deal of my time in the Government, the problems of combatting rural insurgency in an underdeveloped country, specifically South Vietnam. But as I was informing myself a bit about the nature of this audience and this area, I was struck by the exceedingly sharp contrast between the salient features of the citizens and the environment I am encountering today and those of the large areas of the world that are vulnerable to insurgency.

Among the first things I learned about northeast Minnesota was the dramatic upswing you are enjoying as the result of the technical innovation of taconite mining. I learned the way in which that development resulted from local foresight, cooperation, planning and initiative, including the contributions of a professor at the University of Minnesota and of another individual who is now providing you outstanding representation in Congress. I learned also of the role played in this upswing by the high level of education upon which Minnesota has always insisted, including in particular the contributions of the University of Minnesota.

Now, technical innovation, local initiative and cooperation, good local government and national representation, and widespread civic, technical and university training happen to be the sorts of activities and resources that are most notably lacking in the underdeveloped societies that I shall be describing. In fact, if I were to go on to describe the major characteristics of Minnesota social and political and economic

life, I could almost define the class of societies vulnerable to the Communist techniques of terrorism and insurgency --^{and} that includes a very large part of the population and territory of the world -- by the absence or the opposite of those characteristics.

That means, I am glad to say, that I do not expect to have to be dealing with the problem of Communist insurgency in northeast Minnesota any time soon. It may also mean that this audience will have to make a special effort of imagination to understand the sorts of conditions underlying the problems that concern us today in South Vietnam.

For some of my colleagues in the Government who deal with Vietnam problems it would by now be a familiar experience to be confronting an academic audience on this subject. For them, just as for those of you, I am sure, who are graduating today, the end of this school year is an occasion they regard with very mixed feelings: for it marks the end of a season of "teach-ins" on our Vietnam policy.

I may be speaking prematurely; perhaps those of you who missed the National Teach-in in mid-May or the other all-night debates that preceded it are planning to fill the summer vacation with marches on Washington. But I suspect not. At least, I have the impression that most of the tired debaters who closed up the Washington teach-in in the early morning hours this May had reached a private judgment that their own need to discuss this particular subject all night had been largely satisfied.

For my own part, like certain others I was forced by a crisis in the Caribbean to be a drop-out from the Teach-in in Washington. With the school term ending, I would like to take this last opportunity to comment today on a few of the issues of our involvement in Vietnam that the earlier debates, as I have followed them, have shown to divide, in a rough way, proponents of the Government's policy from its critics.

REMARKS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)
JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, AT THE ROTARY DISTRICT CONFERENCE
ZION, ILLINOIS, APRIL 28, 1965

I am very glad to have the opportunity to address this audience of Rotarians. I remember with great pleasure the years that I spent as a Rotarian, before I became a law professor, and then, went into the government.

Tonight I would like to talk to you about South Vietnam.

You heard the President speak on April 7. He explained why we are in Vietnam: First, we are there to keep a promise to the people of South Vietnam. The promise of the United States has been made by three successive Presidents -- Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. The promise, starting with President Eisenhower's letter to Vietnamese President Diem in October 1954 and continuing through President Johnson's statement at Johns Hopkins University three weeks ago, have been expressed often, clearly and in constant terms. It would be wrong to break that promise.

Second, we are there to strengthen world order by demonstrating to free people of the world that our word remains and will remain good. The value of the national pledge of the United States -- the credibility of that pledge, not only in Vietnam but as the President said, "from Berlin to Thailand" -- is at stake today in our undertaking behind the Government and people of South Vietnam.

Third, we are there to draw a stop-line to Asian Communist aggression. Since the end of the Second World War, the leaders of what is now North Vietnam have worked to impose a Communist state over all of Vietnam. Their further ambitions extend at least to the remaining parts of former French

Indochina -- Laos and Cambodia. Their campaign was accelerated in 1960, about the time that Ho Chi Minh announced at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party the necessity for North Vietnam "to step up the . . . revolution in the South." And close behind the Hanoi regime, supporting it and spurring it on in pursuit of its goals, are the leaders of Communist China. A Free World withdrawal from the challenge in the jungles and mountains of Vietnam would merely transfer the battle line to other places. How much had to be swallowed up before World War II before we learned that simple lesson?

Finally, we are there on a mission to help South Vietnam -- indeed all of the countries in the area -- to make progress through orderly change. Progress is coming and must come in this changing world. Especially the young people quite properly have great aspirations. Old social structures will be immersed in turbulence. It is for us, with our enormous talents and physical resources, to help men everywhere to find the new course without sacrificing their freedom.

Our objective in South Vietnam is straightforward and easy to state; it is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. The President has made clear that "we will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary."

There you have our ends and guidelines.

Now, coming as I do from the Department of Defense and addressing this particular audience, I think it is appropriate for me to discuss in some detail some issues relating to our military programs in Vietnam.

Specifically, I wish to discuss the motives and implications of two

recent aspects of our programs: One, the US and Vietnamese air strikes against selected military targets in North Vietnam; and the other, the deployment of some US combat units to South Vietnam, along with increased support personnel and with the use of US aircraft in direct combat support within South Vietnam. Why were these steps needed at this time? The President's reluctance to employ them until convinced of their absolute necessity hardly needs explanation. Each of them involves Presidential responsibilities of the highest magnitude -- the hazarding of American lives, and the risk of widening a war.

Then what produced the conviction of their necessity? To understand this, one must understand the nature of the war in South Vietnam.

1. NATURE OF WAR

It is not another Korean war in which conventional military forces face each other along a battle line. Nor is it another Greece, where local rebellious dissidents used neighboring areas as sanctuary. We must understand that, while some of the people of South Vietnam are supporting the Viet Cong, the war is not a local rebellion. What is new and different is that, in Vietnam, the techniques of rebellion have been harnessed by a neighbor set on conquest. We are witnessing a method of concealed aggression that the Communists hope to use against vulnerable nations all over the world. To gauge its prospects of success -- to understand the vulnerabilities it exploits and the requirements for combating it -- we must recognize the basic tactics of their approach. That approach aims, in the first instance, not at destroying armed forces or winning control of territory, but at destroying the roots of the existing government and winning control over population.

This is the process that the Hanoi regime called into play in South Vietnam. It is the process that may be beginning now in Thailand, where we have recently witnessed the assassinations of rural officials, simultaneously with bland statements in Peking that Thailand is ripe for insurgency.

In South Vietnam the assassinations began in earnest in mid-1957, and grew steadily through 1959. In 1960, Communist terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 2,000 local officials, and civilians. In 1964, 436 civic officials were murdered -- an average of 36 a month. In many cases their wives and children were murdered with them. In the same year, 1131 civic officials were kidnapped; and aside from civic officials, 1359 South Vietnamese civilians -- government sympathizers, informers, non-cooperators with the VC -- were assassinated and 8423 civilians were kidnapped or captured.

This bleeding and intimidation of the government structure in South Vietnam has gone on for eight years; and it goes on today, brutal and selective as ever. In March of this year, 36 civic officials were murdered, 11 of them in the single province of Thua Thien, where the Communists are attempting to eliminate governmental authority.

The rate of terrorism rose sharply to its present level between 1963 and 1964, from about 700 incidents a month through most of 1963 to a range between 1500 and 2000 a month in 1964. Figures like these are as hard to comprehend as national budget totals; but what we are talking about, for a single month, is 2000 separate acts of violence -- assassinations, bombings, kidnappings -- against unarmed civilians.

In the cities, where the Viet Cong does not yet aspire to control, their terrorism has a different, less discriminating character: there, the grenade in the cafe, the bomb in the street, killing women and children randomly, advertises the presence of the VC and creates general anxiety and unrest. But in the countryside, where the VC hopes to eliminate the physical presence of the government and substitute their own control, the terrorism is more sharply focussed on the particular individuals that stand in their way. It is more precise in its targets, but it is no less brutal. Ruthlessness and ferocity are essential to its political effect.

Statistics alone cannot convey the full meaning of this process in what has become the way of life in rural South Vietnam. I have no desire to press on you the repellent details of the incidents that the Government is forced to record in its complaints to the International Control Commission. These reports recount the manner of death of young girls like Phan-thi-Trinh, whose crime was to be Chief of the Republican Youth in Binh-Thanh hamlet, Kien-Hoa Province, and of old men like Dang-thien-Mon, who at 70 was treasurer of the Grung-Hai fishing cooperative in Cat-Son hamlet, Trung-Luong. For their "crimes" these two, like thousands of others, were taken in the night, "sentenced," and executed on the spot by submachine bullets. In typical fashion, the executioners made clear their identity, as a warning to others, by pinning to the girl's body a death sentence signed by the "Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam." Other bodies, bearing the death sentence of the Forces for the Liberation of the South, are found beheaded or with the throats cut. The families of victims, if they are not killed at the time, may be

pursued. Thus, just two weeks after her husband was shot down by the VC, Mrs. Hoang-thi-Con was knifed in her bed as she slept with her two young daughters. Despite her wounds, she managed to run away for help; but the terrorists' knives left her 11 year-old daughter badly wounded and her 9 year-old daughter dead. It is names and stories like these that you must read into the statistics I have given you -- statistics that tell of 11,000 civilians murdered or kidnapped in 1964, equivalent in terms of US population to far more than 100,000 Americans -- if you are to judge the impact of this terrorism on the will of the rural population to resist the Viet Cong. And yet, remarkably, that will persists, as is demonstrated by the continued willingness of South Vietnamese to accept the village posts that make them targets for attack, or to join the Popular Forces that man village defenses against the night raids of the VC.

What forces are required to combat such organized terror? The rule is commonly heard that government forces need a superiority ratio of 10 or 15 to 1 to master the threat posed by guerrilla forces and terrorists. This partly reflects actual experience in countries where insurgencies have been successfully suppressed -- e.g., Malaya. But it follows directly from the nature of the guerrilla challenge I have described to you.

Provided by North Vietnam with the critical margins of manpower, materiel and direction, the Viet Cong destroy and run, usually at night. They sabotage a railroad bridge, forcing the government to guard them all; they bomb a restaurant, causing all public places to be searched and protected; they assassinate a village chief, overloading the police and making good administrators hard to recruit.

Not only must the government forces tie down troops and police defending the most important people and facilities, but it must have quick reaction forces in regional reserves, if they are to limit the guerrillas to hit-and-run attacks. And, to seek out and destroy an elusive enemy who has no responsibilities to defend territory or people and can choose to evade battle, they must invest massive efforts in searching and encircling operations.

All of this is beyond the reach of a force that outnumbers its opponents only 4 to 1 or less, as the regular and paramilitary forces of South Vietnam do today.

The main force units of the Viet Cong -- their well-trained, well-equipped, full-time regulars in organized combat units -- are now estimated to number from 38-46,000, and their irregular forces 100,000.

These guerrilla forces of 140,000 are too much for the present 565,000 South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary and police forces to handle if they are to provide, as I have indicated they must provide, security for citizens and officials and hamlets throughout the country.

Yet as the government forces expand, infiltration from North Vietnam continues to swell the ranks and provide crucial leadership and technical support of the Viet Cong. Interrogations and documents have so far established the probable infiltration of over 39,000 men since 1959, including 5-8000 last year. Considering the usual time lag between infiltration and this sort of confirmation, we estimate that at least 10,000 infiltrators entered in 1964.

The importance of these infiltrators to the Viet Cong is far out of proportion to their numbers. Most of them have been seasoned guerrilla fighters from the campaign before 1954. They form the great majority

of what the Communists call the "cadre": the organizational and unit leadership, all the way from central and regimental headquarters down to squad level. They extend the chain of discipline from Communist Party and military command headquarters in Hanoi down to the districts and hamlets of South Vietnam. They are the technical experts, the weapons specialists, the key communicators, the propagandists.

The locally-recruited or coerced South Vietnamese in the Viet Cong form the majority of the irregulars, the part-time guerrillas and helpers. But the infiltrators form the majority of the hard core Viet Cong; they are the brains and the backbone of the movement as a whole.

A newer type of infiltrator, swelling the ranks of the main force troops, is the young ethnic North Vietnamese draftee, sent down in units 500-600 strong; these form up to 75% of the infiltrators in 1964. Their appearance makes clear the determination of North Vietnam to maintain the flow of infiltrators despite the drying up of the pool of former South Vietnamese who obeyed the orders of the Viet Minh to move North in 1954. Still further evidence of this intent is the appearance, just recently determined and reported, of a regular combat unit of the North Vietnamese Army, the 2d Battalion of the 101st Regiment, 325th Division, in northwest Kontum Province in South Vietnam.

Another way in which North Vietnam plays a crucial role in the support of the Viet Cong is the supply of arms and ammunition. You may have heard Secretary McNamara's press conference on television on Monday. As he pointed out, over 80% of the weapons requirements of the Viet Cong must be supplied from outside. Capture from government troops -- mostly Popular Forces and regional militia -- has netted the VC only 14,000

weapons over the last four years. The remaining weapons for their 38-46,000 main force troops and for their 100,000 irregulars have had to come from outside South Vietnam. Let me describe the representative mix of weapons captured from one VC main force element on the 5th and 6th of this month. It consisted of one US M1 rifle, four US carbines, two Czech assault rifles, one East German light machine gun, and the rest Chinese Communist weapons, including 72 of their latest rifles and carbines, 11 assault rifles, four light machine guns, two 60mm mortars, three rocket launchers and a 75mm recoilless rifle. Thus, of 101 weapons, 90% of the small arms and all of the heavier weapons were Communist Bloc weapons, nearly all Communist Chinese.

From this picture of the over-all challenge, three conclusions follow: First, it is essential that the manpower balance within South Vietnam be shifted in favor of the government forces. Second, it is essential that the critical flow of personnel, support and direction from North Vietnam be reduced. And third, is a point of principal -- that the enemy cannot be permitted to continue to have the unfair advantage implicit in his concealed aggression.

We have taken a number of steps to redress the manpower imbalance. An increase of 160,000 South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces and police is underway. In this connection, the 10,000 recruits by the regular forces in March -- higher than the goals and two-thirds of them volunteers -- give encouragement. The loss ratios in the first week in April were 643 Viet Cong killed as compared with 155 Vietnamese. In that same week there were 129 defections of Viet Cong military personnel and 23 political cadre -- significant because this was the highest weekly number since statistics had started in January, 1964. But the number of defections for the following week was even higher, including 146 VC military personnel. The loss ratio was even more favorable for the week 17-24 April: the government forces lost 102 killed and 60 missing or captured to the VC's 607 killed and 148 captured, an unprecedented ratio. In two large search and destroy operations, the combined figures for VC killed were 423 compared to friendly losses of 41. And as a further indication of the "balance of morale," for the third week in two months, weapons losses were higher for the VC than for the government.

We are finding ways to "stretch" the South Vietnamese manpower -- by giving it better planning, increased mobility, better communications and

logistics support, better weapons, and close air support. And we have released some South Vietnamese units for offensive employment by the deployment of US combat units; we have now close to 9000 marines in the Danang area.

To reduce the critical flow of personnel, support and direction from North Vietnam, we have been forced to make attacks on North Vietnam by air. The purposes of the strikes are to slow down the aggression, to give heart to the suffering people of South Vietnam, and to convince the leaders of North Vietnam that the United States will see her commitment through -- that the United States is prepared for a long continued conflict.

You will recall that, in addition to the continuous terrorist assaults on things primarily Vietnamese, the United States had absorbed the October attack at Bien Hoa airfield, that we had absorbed the Christmas eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, and that on February 7 the Viet Cong killed 8 and wounded 133 Americans at the Pleiku base in northern Vietnam.

On that February 7, the US and Vietnamese strikes, against North Vietnamese barracks along the infiltration feeder routes, were carried out in less than 20 hours. Since then, there have been more than two dozen strikes on North Vietnamese targets -- radar stations, ammunition and supply depots, airfields, barracks, roads, railroad lines, bridges, and so on. The targets have been chosen carefully to avoid civilian damage but to reduce the North Vietnamese capability to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam.

No one believes that the air strikes alone will be sufficient, but along with continued efforts in the South they are essential to a solution. They are essential to cut the flow of supplies. They are essential to

convince Hanoi that their efforts in the South cannot succeed -- to prove to them for the first time that their acts of aggression do bring danger to them directly and do carry costs. The strikes give the North for the first time a reason to worry, and a reason to quit. By the same token, they give the Viet Cong in the South a reason to worry that the Northerners will quit, a reason to doubt that the long hardships of the guerrilla life must eventually, with outside support, ^{end in victory,} ~~win out.~~ [The strikes confront the Communist Chinese with the new fact that their adventures in the Peninsula are no longer cheap -- their encouragement of the North Vietnamese campaign can involve them in serious risks.] All of these effects should grow with time.

This brings me to my third point -- the point of principle involved.

Until the South Vietnamese-US air strike of February 7, we had a situation with which we are all familiar in our own personal experience. It is a situation in which the holder of an unfair advantage understandably hates to give it up.

Frustrated because they cannot achieve their ends [by open and fair competition, or even by open warfare -- unable to see their way to success] in the market place of ideas or even by way of the open battlefield -- the Communists have gone underground; they have chosen the route of stealth, deceit, sabotage and assassination. They call this route "wars of national liberation."

By casting an ominous military shadow from outside a small nation's borders, by injection of soldiers in disguise, and by massive and secret help and direction to the disgruntled and irresponsible minorities within

convince Hanoi that their efforts in the South cannot succeed -- to prove to them for the first time that their acts of aggression do bring danger to them directly and do carry costs. The strikes give the North for the first time a reason to worry, and a reason to quit. By the same token, they give the Viet Cong in the South a reason to worry that the Northerners will quit, a reason to doubt that the long hardships of the guerrilla life must eventually, with outside support, win out. The strikes confront the Communist Chinese with the new fact that their adventures in the Peninsula are no longer cheap -- their encouragement of the North Vietnamese campaign can involve them in serious risks. All of these effects should grow with time.

This brings me to my third point -- the point of principle involved.

Until the South Vietnamese-US air strike of February 7, we had a situation with which we are all familiar in our own personal experience. It is a situation in which the holder of an unfair advantage understandably hates to give it up.

Frustrated because they cannot achieve their ends by open and fair competition, or even by open warfare -- unable to see their way to success in the market place of ideas or even by way of the open battlefield -- the Communists have gone underground; they have chosen the route of stealth, deceit, sabotage and assassination. They call this route "wars of national liberation."

By casting an ominous military shadow from outside a small nation's borders, by injection of soldiers in disguise, and by massive and secret help and direction to the disgruntled and irresponsible minorities within

was even higher, adding to 533 for April. In the last week in May the number was almost as high for a single week: 354 VC military defections.

Finally, the strikes confront the Communist Chinese with the new fact that their adventures in the Peninsula are no longer cheap--their encouragement of the North Vietnamese campaign can involve them in serious risks.

All of these effects should grow with time.

~~In effect~~^{Thus}, our combat and support troops and our air support are needed within South Vietnam, in large part because of the scale of past infiltration from the North; our air strikes against the North are needed to impede and deter further infiltration^{from the North;} and both are needed to convince North Vietnam that the war cannot be won in the South and that its national interests lie in a peaceful settlement. It is the support, infiltration and management from North Vietnam that has made necessary the current level of US support to South Vietnam, and particularly the current involvement of US combat forces. It is within the power of North Vietnam to make our combat involvements and current levels of support unnecessary.

North Vietnam can stop its infiltration of men and materiel; can stop its clandestine direction and encouragement of the insurgency in the South; can order a stop to the Viet Cong campaign of terror and sabotage in the South; and can remove its controlled units and cadres from the South. It is to help achieve these ends that the air strikes are now being carried out against the North; it is to help achieve these ends that US forces -- military support and combat -- are in South Vietnam. North Vietnam might

^{to this}
~~take these measures~~ as the result of negotiations, formal or informal, or in response to their own calculations of their prospects and risks. In any case, our own actions would be influenced by the facts and effects of what they actually do, and not by promises or what they say they are doing.

those borders, the Communists strike at what is at first the weakness, but what ultimately is the strength of nations that would be free. In a nation yet only on the first or second rung of the ladder of freedom, it takes many free men to build what one Communist can destroy. It takes many free men to watch where one Communist might strike. The Communists therefore find themselves in a position of holding the ability to harass and bedevil and bleed and intimidate by night a struggling nation to the edge of exhaustion.

They weree growing accustomed to this advantage. And this of course is the way they would have left it. But surely they could not have expected their victims -- their targets -- peoples not of their "religion," to go along with such one-sided rules of conflict!

In Vietnam, as you can tell from our recent actions, we no longer accept the disadvantage which the Communists would impose on us. Together with the South Vietnamese, we will strive, despite harassment, to achieve a peaceful countryside and to build a better future for the population. But at the same time, we will respond outside the borders of South Vietnam as appropriate to stop the external aggression.

P This, then, is the question that I would ask the critics of our present policies.
Is it too much to ask North Vietnam to stop its infiltration of men and materiel; to stop its clandestine direction and encouragement of the insurgency in the South; to order a stop to the Viet Cong campaign of terror and sabotage in the South; and to remove its controlled units and cadres from the South? It is to help achieve these ends that the air strikes are now being carried out against the North; it is to help achieve these ends that US forces -- military support and combat -- are in South Vietnam. Is there not some way in which the Government of South Vietnam -- absent these

intrusions from the North and without the need for massive military assistance from the outside -- can be allowed to find its own way peacefully toward its own consensus and fulfillment?

The people of the United States and of the other nations of the Free World have a dream which is finer than that of the Communists. It is a dream of independence, of fast but orderly change, of as much individual freedom as possible as soon as possible. This is the real goal of all men. We in the Free World are not convinced -- and we do not expect to be convinced -- that it is necessary for the developing nations of the world, in reaching this goal of freedom, to go through an oppressive intermediate stage of Communism.

We want a peaceful solution to the problem in South Vietnam. We want it very much. We seek no territory there. Nor do we wish to destroy North Vietnam or even, little as we like it, its regime. We want only an independent South Vietnam -- as President Johnson said, "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no other country ... We remain ready, with these purposes, for unconditional discussions" with the governments concerned.

those borders, the Communists strike at what is at first the weakness, but what ultimately is the strength of nations that would be free. In a nation yet only on the first or second rung of the ladder of freedom, it takes many free men to build what one Communist can destroy. It takes many free men to watch where one Communist might strike. The Communists therefore find themselves in a position of holding the ability to harass and bedevil and bleed and intimidate by night a struggling nation to the edge of exhaustion.

They weree growing accustomed to this advantage. And this of course is the way they would have left it. But surely they could not have expected their victims -- their targets -- peoples not of their ^{Communist} "religion," to go along with such one-sided rules of conflict!

In Vietnam, as you can tell from our recent actions, we no longer accept the disadvantage which the Communists would impose on us. Together with the South Vietnamese, we will strive, despite harassment, to achieve a peaceful countryside and to build a better future for the population. But at the same time, we will respond outside the borders of South Vietnam as appropriate to stop the external aggression.

Is it too much to ask North Vietnam to stop its infiltration of men and materiel; to stop its clandestine direction and encouragement of the insurgency in the South; to order a stop to the Viet Cong campaign of terror and sabotage in the South; and to remove its controlled units and cadres from the South? It is to help achieve these ends that the air strikes are now being carried out against the North; it is to help achieve these ends that US forces -- military support and combat -- are in South Vietnam. Is there not some way in which the Government of South Vietnam -- absent these

intrusions from the North and without the need for massive military assistance from the outside -- can be allowed to find its own way peacefully toward its own consensus and fulfillment?

The people of the United States and of the other nations of the Free World have a dream which is finer than that of the Communists. It is a dream of independence, of fast but orderly change, of as much individual freedom as possible as soon as possible. This is the real goal of all men. We in the Free World are not convinced -- and we do not expect to be convinced -- that it is necessary for the developing nations of the world, in reaching this goal of freedom, to go through an oppressive intermediate stage of Communism.

We want a peaceful solution to the problem in South Vietnam. We want it very much. We seek no territory there. Nor do we wish to destroy North Vietnam or even, little as we like it, its regime. We want only an independent South Vietnam -- as President Johnson said, "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no other country ... We remain ready, with these purposes, for unconditional discussions" with the governments concerned.